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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
All the relevant parties to the proceedings below are listed in the caption. 
Additionally, U. S. Bancorp filed a counterclaim, cross-claim, and third-party complaint 
captioned: U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Company, formerly U. S. Bancorp Real Estate Services. 
Counter-Claimant and Third-Party Plaintiff v. Steven C. Davis and Kristi A. Davis. Counter-
claim Defendants. H. Clyde Davis. Cross-Claim Defendant, James K. Bills an individual dba 
Service Master of Utah County. Service Master of Utah County. Inc.. a Utah corporation. 
Capital Credit Corp,. a Utah corporation. Bonneville Billing and Collections, a Utah corporation. 
Duane A. Frandsen. as Trustee, and John Does I through V. Third-Party Defendants. 
Involuntary defendant and cross-defendant H. Clyde Davis and the other third-party defendants 
did not file an appeal of the judgment rendered against them. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to the Utah Constitution, Article 
VIII, Section 3, and Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Were there any genuine issues of material fact raised by plaintiffs that would 
preclude summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: "Appellate courts scrutinize summary judgments under the 
same standard applied by the trial courts, according no particular deference to the lower court's 
legal conclusions concerning whether the material facts are in dispute and, if they are not, what 
legal result obtains." Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); accord Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l. Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). This Court 
may affirm summary judgment on any proper grounds, even if different from those relied on by 
the lower court. Branch v. Western Petroleum. Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982); Jesperson 
v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). Where no material facts remain unresolved, the 
appellate court should examine the lower court's conclusions of law and review them for 
correctness. English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
2. May a party opposing summary judgment now argue additional issues of 
fact that were not presented below? 
Standard of Review: An appellant who fails to proffer evidence in contradiction 
to a motion for summary judgment at the trial level will not be permitted to now raise the issue 
for the first time on appeal. Schaer v. State by and through Utah Department of Transportation, 
1 
657 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Utah 1983), citing Shayne v. Stanley & Sons. Inc.. 605 P.2d 775 (Utah 
1980). 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to award defendant's requested attorney 
fees? 
Standard of Review: The interpretation of a contract provision relating to attorney 
fees is a question of law on which the appellate court need not defer to the trial court. Faulkner 
v. Famsworth. 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986). In the absence of abuse of discretion, the 
amount awarded by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal. Paul Mueller Company v. 
Cache Valley Dairy Association. 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 4-501(2)(b), Code of Judicial 
\dministration. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is plaintiffs' appeal from a final judgment granted upon defendant U. S. 
lancorp's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims against U. S. Bancorp 
nth prejudice; thereafter, U. S. Bancorp obtained a Judgment of Foreclosure pursuant to its 
xmterclaim against plaintiffs and involuntary defendant H. Clyde Davis and other lien creditors, 
[r. Clyde Davis and other third-party defendants have not appealed the judgment against them, 
tie defendant U. S. Bancorp cross-appeals the lower court's denial of requested attorney fees. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below. 
In early 1992, with the intention of stopping a non-judicial foreclosure action 
initiated by U.S. Bancorp, plaintiffs Steven and Kristi Davis filed a lawsuit against U. S. 
Bancorp in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, Civil No. 920400090, the 
Honorable Cullen Christensen presiding. (R. 281) In that lawsuit the Davises made the same 
allegations as in the present case. (R. 281) In the former lawsuit, the Davises failed to 
adequately respond to discovery requests, filing evasive and non-responsive answers; accordingly, 
on November 24, 1992, Judge Christensen granted a motion to dismiss, without prejudice. (R. 
277) 
The Davises refiled their action on December 23, 1992. (R. 13) In an effort to 
prevent the non-judicial foreclosure by U. S. Bancorp, plaintiffs alleged ten causes of action, 
viz., misrepresentation, estoppel-good standing, anticipatory breach, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, defamation of credit, defamation, 
slander of title, breach of fiduciary duty, and RICO. (R. 1-13) Counsel from Suitter Axland 
& Hanson was retained to defend against plaintiffs' tort claims, and counsel from Elggren & Van 
Dyke was retained to pursue U. S. Bancorp's counterclaim. 
After receiving leave of the Court (R. 199), U. S. Bancorp filed an Amended 
Answer which included a Counterclaim, a Cross-Claim, and a Third-Party Complaint seeking 
judicial foreclosure of real property. (R. 211-255) The matter was set for trial for Monday, 
January 3, 1994, with a final pretrial conference scheduled for December 17, 1993. (R. 283) 
On June 3, 1993, U. S. Bancorp served discovery requests on cross-defendant 
Clyde Davis. (R. 271-274) On June 29, 1993, U. S. Bancorp served discovery requests on the 
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Davises. (R. 261-269) When the Davises failed to respond to discovery, U. S. Bancorp filed 
a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Compel Responses on August 6, 1993, (R. 256-258) 
supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities. (R. 259-282) The court granted U. S. 
Bancorp's Motion to Compel on October 8, 1993, giving the Davises ten days to fully and 
completely respond to the discovery requests, else the court would entertain a motion to dismiss 
the Complaint with prejudice. (R. 340-341) 
On October 18, 1993, a few documents were delivered to counsel for U. S. 
Bancorp which were purported to be responsive to the Clyde Davis discovery requests. (R. 346-
348) No responses to discovery were filed by the Davises as ordered by the court. U. S. 
Bancorp renewed its motion to dismiss on November 10, 1993, (R. 354-356), supported by an 
affidavit of counsel detailing the deficiencies in the discovery responses. (R. 357-397) On 
November 19, 1993, forty days after the court's order compelling discovery, the Davises served 
a limited two-page response to U. S. Bancorp's twenty-one interrogatories. (R. 407, 411-412) 
In the memorandum in opposition to the renewed motion to dismiss which was served on 
November 18, 1993, counsel for the Davises represented: 
All of the requests have been met insofar as it is within the 
power of plaintiffs to answer them . . . . The simple response to 
defendant's unhappiness is that there are no other documents for 
trial other than those which have previously been submitted, that 
there is no correspondence between the Davis' and that there are 
no pertinent diaries, notes, journals or appointment books. 
With regard to defendant's witness list objection. Deposi-
tions were taken of the witnesses after disclosure of the witness list 
and no testimony will be elicited at trial beyond that which was 
determined at the depositions. The depositions, as a complete 
summary of testimony, should be adequate for trial preparation of 
defendants, and plaintiffs will not go beyond the subjects which 
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were in fact elicited during the deposition testimony thereof, [sic, 
except where emphasis added] (R. 404-406) 
At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss held at the pretrial conference only two 
weeks before trial on December 17, 1993, counsel for the Davises represented that they had 
produced everything they had; accordingly, the court allowed counsel for U. S. Bancorp to file 
a Motion for Summary Judgment to be argued on the morning of January 3, 1994, the date 
scheduled for trial. (R. 419-420) In open court at the pretrial conference, the parties stipulated 
to dismissal of plaintiffs' Fourth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action, leaving the 
remaining claims to be addressed either by summary judgment or trial. (R. 552) 
In its Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, U. S. Bancorp detailed 
twenty-eight undisputed facts. (R. 432-439) On December 31, 1993, the Davises served a 
memorandum containing three proposed disputed facts in opposition to the motion. (R. 449 and 
457) At oral argument on Monday, January 3, 1994, the morning of trial, counsel for U. S. 
Bancorp objected to the statement of disputed facts presented by plaintiffs, contending that the 
three proposed disputed facts were not supported by the references to the record. (R. 552-553) 
U.S. Bancorp's motion for summary judgment was granted on January 3, 1994. 
(R. 552) Counsel for U. S. Bancorp proffered testimony about his attorney's fees associated 
with defending the claims; however, the court found that the plaintiffs' action was not brought 
in bad faith and that the attorney's fees associated with defending the claims would not be of the 
type that were recoverable under the credit agreement executed by plaintiffs. (R. 552) 
On January 4, 1994, the Court received evidence on U. S. Bancorp's Counter-
claim, Cross-Claim and Third-Party Complaint. (R. 448) Counsel for U. S. Bancorp presented 
evidence regarding attorney's fees associated with the foreclosure action. (R. 464-518) The 
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Court reduced counsel's request for attorney's fees by 68.8 hours, holding that those fees were 
not recoverable under the Credit Line Agreement or other provisions of the Trust Deed between 
the parties. (R. 566-570) Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and an Amended 
Decree of Foreclosure were rendered in March 11, 1994. (R. 573-591) Plaintiffs filed their 
appeal April 7, 1994. (R. 592-593) U. S. Bancorp timely filed a cross-appeal. (R. 743-744, 
R. 597-598) 
C. Statement of Facts 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration, the following facts 
were established by the unopposed Statement of Undisputed Facts contained in the Memorandum 
in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 432-439): 
1. Kristi A. Davis and H. Clyde Davis are owners of real property in 
Highland, Utah, located at 9866 North Meadow Lane, described as Lot 28 Plat A Pheasant 
Hollow PUD (the "real property"). (Amended Complaint, 15.) (R. 49) 
2. Steven C. Davis is the husband of Kristi Davis and does not own any 
interest in the real property. (Amended Complaint, 16 (R. 49); Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 
25:7-11, p. 50:12 through p. 51:9.) 
3. Kristi Davis, Clyde Davis and Steven Davis obtained a credit line from 
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Company, formerly known as U. S. Bancorp Real Estate Services and 
U. S. Thrift & Loan. The line of credit is secured by the real property. (U. S. Credit Line 
Revolving Credit Agreement and Disclosure (R. 94-95); U. S. Thrift & Loan deed of trust 
recorded in Book 2318 beginning at page 459 of the Utah County Recorder's Office.) (R. 93) 
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4. The Davises have not made a withdrawal from the credit line since March 
1987. (Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 109:17-24.) 
5. On June 17, 1991, $19,000 was paid to U. S. Bancorp. The $19,000 was 
obtained from funds belonging to Clyde Davis. (Steven Davis Deposition, p. 56:1-5.)* 
6. The Davises have not made a payment on the account since September 
1991. (Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 71:6-18.) 
7. After the $19,000 payment was made, Steven Davis' doctor told him to 
get on with life and go back to school. (Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 77:21-25.) 
FACTS RELEVANT TO FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION 
(MISREPRESENTATION AND ESTOPPEU 
8. Plaintiffs claim that Chris Wold made certain representations to them 
regarding the use of the credit line after the $19,000 payment, and that U. S. Bancorp has 
wrongfully refused to allow withdrawals on the line of credit. 
9. From the deposition of Steven Davis (p. 61:20 through p. 62:14): 
Q: Tell me as close as you can exactly what Chris Wold said 
about reopening the line of credit. 
A: Well, he said, "This will go towards the principal in your 
line of credit." And I says, "How long is this line of credit 
still good?" 
And he says, "Oh, for many, many years, I'm sure you 
can-I'm sure in the worst case that you have to do, you 
can sell your house and pay your dad back the $20,000 and 
pay us off." 
1
 Additionally, two $500 payments were given at this time in the form of post-dated 
checks. 
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* * * * 
It was, let's get you going, get you back up. But I've been 
doing this for Bert Wilson for years, telling him and paying 
him. 
10. The only damages claimed by plaintiffs as a result of the alleged 
misrepresentations were: "Plaintiffs were forced to take out a student loan and incurred 
additional interest charges" (Amended Complaint, 142) (R.45); post-traumatic stress syndrome 
(Response to Interrogatory No. 7) (R. 411-412); damaged social relations with neighbors 
(Response to Interrogatory No. 7) (R. 411-412); extreme disruption of family life (Response to 
Interrogatory No. 7) (R. 411-412); and lost wages due to setback for post-traumatic stress 
syndrome and time required to fight this action (Response to Interrogatory No. 7) (R. 411-412). 
11. From the deposition of Clyde Davis (September 1992, p. 19:8-11): 
Q: Did you have any discussions about the use of that line of 
credit after that time or~ 
A: No, they were so happy to get the money. I didn't talk to 
him about it. 
p. 23:21): 
12. From the deposition of Clyde Davis (September 1992, p. 22:16 through 
Q: Did you discuss with anyone at U. S. Bancorp whether 
Steve could draw on that credit line again after making a 
payment of $20,000? 
A: Well, it was my understanding that- I said the line of 
credit, and it remained the same, and that was basically— 
that was my intent and that was my understanding. 
Q: Was that ever discussed with anyone at U. S. Bancorp? 
A: Whoever I had talked to and told them I'd pay the $20,000. 
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Q: So what did you tell him that made you have that under-
standing? 
A: Oh, that it would go on. Just like this $20,000 was just a 
continuation, that it was to work, it just reduced the line of 
credit and everything would be the same. I assumed then 
that there would be less payments too that they'd be asking 
on a monthly basis. 
Q: Was there any discussion about those monthly payments? 
A: As I say, they were just happy to have the $20,000. 
Q: And what I'm grasping from your conversation, that there 
wasn't any real discussion about what would happen to the 
credit line after the $20,000 was paid, whether there was 
going to be any further reduction or if it was just going to 
be Steve's obligation or whether he could draw on the 
account. 
A: Well, I told them I was helping him out on his line of 
credit and I paid $20,000, and it was my assumption and 
theirs, that it would go on just like it was, and the $20,000 
was so I'd quit receiving a lot of letters from them. Maybe 
I shouldn't say that, that was in jest. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(ANTICIPATORY BREACH^ 
13. Plaintiffs claim damages arising from being unable to withdraw funds to 
use for education costs and to pay back to U. S. Bancorp as payments on account. 
14. Prior to 1991, the Davises from time to time would withdraw funds from 
the line of credit and repay those funds within a few days as a payment on account. This 
occasional practice was sometimes discussed with Bert Wilson, a former U. S. Bancorp 
employee. (Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 52:12 through p. 55:25.) 
15. Because Steven Davis could not withdraw funds from the credit line, he 
had to take out student loans of approximately $2,500. While he was in school he did not have 
9 
to pay any interest on the student loans. Mr. Davis does not know the interest rate on the 
student loans or if the interest rate is less than or more than the interest on the credit line. 
(Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 81:5-24.) 
16. In January or February 1992, Steven Davis received approximately $2,000 
for costs of education at UVCC for classes beginning in the fall of 1991. (Deposition of Steven 
Davis, p. 37:15-38 through 38:3. 
17. As a claimed anticipatory breach of contract, plaintiffs claim to have 
suffered the following damages: 
a. Post-traumatic stress syndrome (Response to Interrogatory No. 10) 
(R. 411-412); 
b. Damaged social relations with neighbors (Response to Interrogatory 
No. 10) (R. 411-412); 
c. Extreme disruption of family life (Response to Interrogatory No. 
10) (R, 411-412); and 
d. Lost wages due to post-traumatic stress syndrome (Response to 
Interrogatory No. 10) (R. 411-412). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS) 
18. Prior to 1991, Steven Davis dealt with Mr. Bert Wilson, a U. S. Bancorp 
employee. Mr, Davis had a comfortable relationship with Bert Wilson, who knew very much 
about the Davises' personal situation during that period of time, (Deposition of Steven Davis, 
p. 51:10 through p, 52:11.) 
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19. At the time the $19,000 payment was made to U. S. Bancorp, Chris Wold 
had only been working on the Davis account for a few months and was a "newcomer" on the 
account and situation. (Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 56:1-22). 
20. Prior to paying the $19,000, Steven Davis had met with Chris Wold a total 
of four times, two in person and two by telephone. (Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 57:18 
through p. 58:12.) 
21. Steven Davis made these statements to Chris Wold: "Do not foreclose on 
us, we're in the middle of this adoption situation" and "You people have known it for a long 
time" and "Well, I've got two options to do this, I can make the $500 monthly payments on 
interest only and keep you current and all like that, or what I'd like to do is pay down the 
principal so my interest payments are only $300 a month. So what I'm able to do is cut it down 
so your credit line is not maxed and I've got several more months in the litigation of this 
adoption case." (Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 59:3-5, 9-16.) 
22. There is no evidence that Chris Wold knew anything about the Davises' 
emotional condition during his dealings with them. 
23. Plaintiffs have not identified damages they have suffered for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. (There has been no response to Interrogatory No. 12.) 
Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs' damages would be the same for this cause of action as for 
other causes of action, plaintiffs claim to have suffered: 
a. Post-traumatic stress syndrome; 
b. Damaged social relations with neighbors; 
c. Extreme disruption of family life; and 
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d* Lost wages due to post-traumatic stress syndrome and time required 
to fight this action. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(DEFAMATION) 
24. No witness ever saw any notice posted by U. S. Bancorp. (Deposition of 
Annabelle Davis, p. 5:3-6; deposition of Craig Walkenhorst, p. 14:2-5; deposition of Cheree 
Davis, p. 9:8-12; deposition of Rita Nelson, p. 11:10-15; deposition of Mona Lunceford, p. 
10:13-23; deposition of Deborah Jean Kofford, p. 13:9 through p. 14:19.) 
25. The damages that plaintiffs allegedly suffered to their business and social 
reputations are: 
a. Post-traumatic stress syndrome (Response to Interrogatory No. 14) 
(R. 411-412); 
b. Damaged social relations with neighbors (Response to Interrogatory 
No. 14) (R. 411-412); 
c. Extreme disruption of family life (Response to Interrogatory No. 
14) (R. 411-412); and 
d. Lost wages due to setback for post-traumatic stress syndrome and 
time required to fight this action (Response to Interrogatory No. 14) (R. 411-
412). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(SLANDER OF TITLE) 
26. The plaintiffs did not respond to Interrogatory No. 15, which asked, 
In paragraph 81 of your Complaint, you allege that "U. S. 
Bancorp's actions have affected adversely the stable value of the 
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property." State with particularity all facts to support these 
allegations. (R. 411-412; 266) 
27. The Davises cannot prove any special damages resulting from any 
document being recorded with the Utah County Recorder. To the contrary, Joseph Jennings 
testified as follows: 
Q: Okay. Other than the one earnest money agreement, did 
you have any other people present any earnest money, or 
any offer on the home? 
A: After it was withdrawn, I had someone who said they'd pay 
full—I did not have someone tell me, I had an agent in our 
office tell us that they had somebody that would be quite 
interested in the house, could we go back and sell it. And 
so I called Mr. Davis and he said, "No, we're not going to 
sell at this point in time." And so that was strictly verbal, 
never—there was never any additional offers that came in. 
Q: Who was the agent in your office? 
A: Ken Glen. 
Q: And did he tell you about how much would be offered if 
the opportunity was given? 
A: He said full price, and the full price was, like I said, the 
$189,000 or $189,900 and I don't know if the people had 
seen the home or anything at that point in time. 
Deposition of Joseph P. Jennings, p. 9. 
28. The damages allegedly suffered by plaintiffs for slander of title are: 
a. Post-traumatic stress syndrome (Response to Interrogatory No. 16) 
(R. 411-412); 
b. Damaged social relations with neighbors (Response to Interrogatory 
No. 16) (R. 411-412); 
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c. Extreme disruption of family life (Response to Interrogatory No. 
16) (R. 411-412); and 
d. Lost wages due to setback for post-traumatic stress syndrome and 
time required to fight this action (Response to Interrogatory No. 16). (R. 411-
412) 
DISPUTED FACTS FROM PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R. 457) 
29. Bert Wilson, an agent of U. S. Bancorp, had full knowledge of the post-
traumatic stress syndrome suffered by the Davises. (See Deposition of Steven Davis, Page 51, 
Line 10 through Page 52, Line 11 and Paragraph 18 of undisputed facts of defendant.)2 
30. Clyde Davis was told that the credit line would continue to be open. (See 
Deposition of Clyde Davis, September 9, 1992, Page 24, Line 14 through Line 19.)3 
31. The twenty thousand dollars would never have been paid if the credit line 
had not been considered to be open. (See Deposition of Clyde Davis, Page 28, Line 19 through 
Line 23.)4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The appellants failed to raise material issues of fact in opposition to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. New issues of facts cannot now be raised on appeal. The trial court 
properly granted summary judgment, ruling that appellants failed to offer sufficient evidence to 
prove essential elements of each of their claims. The summary judgment should be affirmed, 
2
 See Appendix D. 
3
 See Appendix E. 
4
 See Appendix E. 
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but the case remanded for an award of reasonable attorney fees in favor of appellee, both on 
appeal and in defense against appellants' claims. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
A PARTY OPPOSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT MUST MARSHAL 
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE LOWER COURT, AND MAY NOT 
PRESENT ADDITIONAL PREVIOUSLY UNRAISED ISSUES 
OF FACT ON APPEAL. 
As required by Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration, appellee 
supported its Motion for Summary Judgment with a Statement of Undisputed Facts. These 
undisputed facts were unopposed with the exception of three "disputed facts" raised by 
appellants.5 The appellants are now attempting to add additional allegations which were not 
presented to the lower court, including: new allegations that appellants "advanced monies in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement and made the necessary payments thereon" 
(Statement of Fact No. 3, Appellants' Brief, p. 8); allegations of "several discussions" with Chris 
Wold, U. S. Bancorp representative, claiming that appellants offered two possible plans to avoid 
foreclosure (Statement of Fact No. 6, Appellants' Brief, p. 9); and an allegation that appellants 
made no additional payments from August 1991 through January 1992 because appellee "failed 
to keep its commitment to allow [appellants] access to the credit line" (Statement of Fact No. 
10, Appellants' Brief, p. 10). 
5
 U. S. Bancorp objected to the three disputed facts, contending that they were not 
accurately supported by the references to the record (R. 552-553); however, the three disputed 
facts did not raise material issues which would preclude summary judgment. 
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These alleged facts were never presented to the trial court in opposition to U. S. 
Bancorp's Motion for Summary Judgment, but are raised for the first time on appeal. 
When a motion for summary judgment is presented and supported by references 
to the record, a party opposing the motion has an affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or 
other evidence to oppose the motion. D & L Supply v. SaurinL 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). An 
opposing party cannot rely on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings to avoid summary 
judgment, Thornock v. Cook. 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979), nor can evidence and affidavits in 
opposition to the motion be merely based on unsubstantiated opinions and beliefs. Treloggan v. 
TrelQggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985); Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp.. 508 P.2d 
538 (Utah 1973). 
New issues of fact cannot be raised on appeal if they are not raised at the trial 
court level. Schaer v. State by and through the Utah Department of Transportation. 657 P.2d 
1337, 1341-42 (Utah 1983). 
Salt Lake City is correct in its contention that summary 
judgment is improper when the facts are uncontroverted. 
However, neither the State nor Salt Lake City presented any 
evidence whatsoever to contest the facts as presented in the 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. . . . 
[W]here the moving party's evidentiary 
material is in itself sufficient and the opposing party 
fails to proffer any evidentiary matter when he is 
presumably in a position to do so, the court should 
be justified in concluding that no genuine issue of 
fact is present, nor would one be present at trial. 
Upon a motion for summary judgment, the 
courts ought to recognize, as a minimum, that the 
opposing party produce some evidentiary matter in 
contradiction of the movant's case or specify in an 
affidavit the reason why he cannot do so. 
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Where . . . the materials presented by the 
moving party are sufficient to entitle him to a 
directed verdict [as a matter of law] and the 
opposing party fails either to offer counteraffidavits 
or other materials that raise a credible issue [of fact] 
or to show that he has evidence not then available, 
summary judgment may be rendered for the moving 
party. 
Thus, because the appellant Salt Lake City failed to proffer 
any evidence at the trial level in contradiction to the plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Salt Lake City will not be 
permitted to now raise the issue for the first time on appeal. 
Because the trial court's ruling was supported by the 
uncontroverted facts, we affirm its granting of summary judgment 
on that issue. 
Id., [citations omitted]. Accord Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.. 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 
P.2d 339, 341 (1957) ("Speaking generally, it is to be assumed that when a plaintiff files his 
action he has sufficient evidence to demonstrate a right to recovery. Ail he is entitled to is a 
reasonable opportunity to marshal and present such evidence.") 
Because of appellants' limited discovery responses, U. S. Bancorp was allowed 
to file a motion for summary judgment within two weeks of the day set for trial. Arguments 
were presented on the morning of trial, and appellants were given every opportunity to marshal 
and proffer whatever evidence they had to oppose U. S. Bancorp's Statement of Undisputed 
Facts. The appellants failed to marshal evidence before the trial court to raise a material issue 
of fact that would have required a trial on their claims. The appellants could not even present 
competent evidence to support their damages claims, stating generally for all causes of action that 
they suffered "post-traumatic stress syndrome," "damaged social relations with neighbors," 
"extreme disruption of family life," and "lost wages due to setback for post-traumatic stress 
syndrome and time required to fight this action." (R. 411-412) The lack of evidence entitles 
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U. S. Bancorp to a directed verdict or summary judgment as a matter of law, Schaer v. State by 
and through Utah Department of Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Utah 1983), since the 
failure to establish an essential element of a party's case renders all other facts immaterial. 
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419-420 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), citing Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). 
Thus, the standard for summary judgment "mirrors the 
standard for a directed verdict" in that a moving party, who has 
otherwise made its case, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
where the "nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient 
showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which 
she has the burden of proof." 
Burns, 876 P.2d at 420, citing Celotex. 
Appellants failed to raise issues of material fact at the trial court level to prevent 
summary judgment. The grant of summary judgment in favor of U. S. Bancorp should be 
affirmed. 
II. 
THERE WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
TO PRECLUDE THE TRIAL COURT FROM 
ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The Appellant Did Not Provide Any Evidence to Support Mispre-
sentation or Estoppel. 
Appellants claim that U. S. Bancorp's representatives made certain 
misrepresentations about the availability of a credit line after a $19,000 payment was made. The 
following were established as undisputed facts concerning the content of the claimed 
misrepresentations: 
1. From the deposition of Steven Davis (pp. 61-62): 
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Tell me as close as you can exactly what Chris Wold said 
about reopening the line of credit. 
Well, he said, "This will go towards the principal in your 
line of credit." And I says, "How long is this line of credit 
still good?" 
And he says, "Oh, for many, many years, I'm sure you 
can—I'm sure in the worst case that you have to do, you 
can sell your house and pay your dad back the $20,000 and 
pay us off." 
From the deposition of Clyde Davis (September 1992, p. 19): 
Did you have any discussions about the use of that line of 
credit after that time or— 
No, they were so happy to get the money. I didn't talk to 
him about it. 
From the deposition of Clyde Davis (September 1992, pp. 22-23): 
Did you discuss with anyone at U. S. Bancorp whether 
Steve could draw on that credit line again after making a 
payment of $20,000? 
Well, it was my understanding that~I said the line of 
credit, and it remained the same, and that was basically-
that was my intent and that was my understanding. 
Was that ever discussed with anyone at U. S. Bancorp? 
Whoever I had talked to and told them I'd pay the $20,000. 
So what did you tell him that made you have that under-
standing? 
Oh, that it would go on. Just like this $20,000 was just a 
continuation, that it was to work, it just reduced the line of 
credit and everything would be the same. I assumed then 
that there would be less payments too that they'd be asking 
on a monthly basis. 
Was there any discussion about those monthly payments? 
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A: As I say, they were just happy to have the $20,000. 
Q: And what I'm grasping from your conversation, that there 
wasn't any real discussion about what would happen to the 
credit line after the $20,000 was paid, whether there was 
going to be any further reduction or if it was just going to 
be Steve's obligation or whether he could draw on the 
account. 
A: Well, I told them I was helping him out on his line of 
credit and I paid $20,000, and it was my assumption and 
theirs, that it would go on just like it was, and the $20,000 
was so I'd quit receiving a lot of letters from them. Maybe 
I shouldn't say that, that was in jest. 
Misrepresentation must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Jardine v. 
Brunswick Corp.. 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 663 (1967). "Clear and convincing evidence" 
is evidence that produces a firm belief, having reached the point where there remains no 
substantial doubt. See MUJI 2.19. The clear and convincing standard carries with it not only 
the power to persuade the mind as to probable correctness, but also has the element of clinching 
such correctness. Jardine v. Archibald. 3 Utah 2d 88, 279 P.2d 454, 457 (Utah 1955), quoting 
Greener v. Greener. 116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194, 204-205 (Utah 1949). 
Despite numerous discovery requests, appellants could not articulate the claimed 
misrepresentations made by U. S. Bancorp. The evidence presented does not amount to 
misrepresentation. 
Additionally, appellants could not prove damages arising out of the claimed 
misrepresentation. The damages claimed as a result of the alleged misrepresentations were: a 
student loan with additional interest charges; post-traumatic stress syndrome; damaged social 
relations with neighbors; extreme disruption of family life; and lost wages due to post-traumatic 
stress syndrome and time required to fight this action. See Undisputed Fact No. 10. No details 
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of these damage claims were ever provided by appellants, even though specific discovery 
requests asked for details and documentary proof. See, e.g.. Interrogatories Nos. 7, 9, 10, 11 
and 12. (R. 267) Appellants did not present any evidence about the additional costs of student 
loans or about lost wages. Consequential money damages must be proven with particularity. 
ONG International (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corporation. 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). 
Emotional damages such as stress, damaged social relations, and disruption of family life are not 
recoverable in a misrepresentations action. The purpose of a fraud action is to return a party to 
status quo ante and emotional damages are not recoverable. Turner v. General Adjustment 
Bureau. Inc.. 832 P.2d 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The claim for misrepresentation failed because appellants did not present any 
material evidence to oppose the statement of undisputed facts, including those necessary to prove 
their damages. 
Estoppel requires (1) proof of a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one 
party that is inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) the other party's reasonable action or 
inaction based upon first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to 
second party that would result from allowing first party to contradict or repudiate the statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act. Van der Heyde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co.. 845 P.2d 275 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Estoppel, too, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
Financial Corp. of America v. Prudential Carbon & Ribbon Co.. 29 Utah 2d 238, 507 P.2d 
1026, 1028 (1973). The absence of evidence concerning statements and damages also applies 
to appellants' estoppel claim. 
21 
Finally, appellants' misrepresentation and estoppel claims are barred by the Statute 
of Frauds. This is exactly the type of claim contemplated by Utah Code Ann.. § 25-5-4(6), 
which provides: 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or 
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed 
by the party to be charged with the agreement: 
(6) Every credit agreement. 
"Credit agreement" is defined as an "agreement by a financial institution to . . 
. delay or otherwise modify an obligation to repay money, . . . or to make any other financial 
accommodation." IdL U. S. Bancorp's alleged promise to leave open a line of credit even 
though appellants were not making payments on the line constitutes a "credit agreement." 
Section 25-5-4(6)(b) expressly provides that "a debtor or a creditor may not maintain an action 
on a credit agreement unless the agreement is in writing, expresses consideration, sets forth the 
relevant terms and conditions, and is signed by the party against whom enforcement of the 
agreement is sought." There is no such written agreement. Further, integrated documents 
subject to the statute of frauds can only be modified in writing. Strevell-Patterson Company. 
Inc. v. Francis. 646 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1982) (alleged oral release must also satisfy statute of 
frauds); Zion's Properties. Inc. v. Holt. 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975) ("It is elementary that 
when a contract is required to be in writing, the same requirement applies with equal force to 
any alteration or modification thereof. More importantly here, any such modifying agreement 
must be sufficently certain and unequivocal in its terms. . . .") 
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The Court of Appeals should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
dismissing appellants' misrepresentation and estoppel claims. 
B. Appellants Have No Claim for Anticipatory Breach of Contract. 
An anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an executory contract manifests a 
positive and unequivocal intent not to render performance when the time fixed for performance 
is due. The other party can immediately treat the anticipatory repudiation as a breach or it can 
continue to treat the contract as operable and urge performance without waiving any right to sue 
for that repudiation. Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson. 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1992). 
In Kasco. the Supreme Court stated: 
We need not decide here whether Benson's announcement 
that he did not intend to abide by the non-competition covenant 
was an anticipatory repudiation. It makes no difference in this 
case. If his remarks were an anticipatory repudiation. Kasco 
simply had an election. It could treat the remark as a breach, or 
it could continue to treat the contract as operable and encourage 
performance without waiving any rights under the contract. If 
there was no anticipatory repudiation, the non-competition 
covenant remained in full force. 
Id. [emphasis added]. 
Anticipatory breach is not a cause of action but rather is a legal ground for the 
non-breaching party to make an election. In this case, if U. S. Bancorp anticipatorily breached 
the agreement, the Davises would simply have a right to elect their remedies. The appellants 
apparently elected to file suit alleging everything from fraud to RICO. A separate claim for 
anticipatory breach is meaningless. 
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C. Any Breach of Contract Claim Was Dismissed by Stipulation. 
In Point III of their brief, appellants contend that the trial court improperly granted 
summary judgment on a breach of contract claim, even though they never made an express claim 
for breach of contract. Appellants rely on the allegations of their Ninth Cause of Action 
(captioned Breach of Fiduciary Duty) (R. 40) to now assert a claim for breach of contract. 
Specifically, appellants alleged in the Ninth Cause of Action that nU. S. Bancorp did not act in 
a reasonable or fiduciary manner in withholding credit line funds summarily and contrary to the 
terms of the Agreement and Trust Deed." (R. 39-40) 
Appellants' arguments in support of their Ninth Cause of Action might otherwise 
be well and good, except that that action was dismissed by stipulation of the parties in open 
court. The order granting summary judgment dismisses the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh 
and Eighth Causes of Action, and then states: "Inasmuch as plaintiffs' other causes of action 
have already been dismissed by stipulation and order, plaintiffs' complaint is now fully dismissed 
with prejudice." (R. 552) 
In any event, the appellants never raised a material issue of fact to show damages 
from the alleged failure of appellee to leave the credit line open, since he was able to obtain 
tuition funds from other sources.6 
6
 See Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 15, "Because Steven Davis could not withdraw 
fiinds from the credit line, he had to take out student loans for approximately $2,500. While he 
was in school he did not have to pay any interest on the student loans. Mr. Davis does not know 
the interest rate on the student loans or if the interest rate is less than or more than the interest 
on the credit line." 
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D. The Undisputed Facts Do Not Establish Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress, 
Utah has adopted the "zone of danger" rule found in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 313, which provides: 
If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to 
another, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting illness 
or bodily harm if the actor (a) should have realized that his conduct 
involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress . . . and (b) 
from facts known to him, should have realized that the distress, if 
it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm. 
Johnson v. Rogers. 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) 
Even if U. S. Bancorp and its employees knew of the appellants' mental frailties, 
there was no evidence that the action to foreclose the real property was anything but lawful. 
Appellants raised no issue of fact showing extreme or outrageous conduct involving an 
unreasonable risk of causing appellants' distress. The exercise of U. S. Bancorp's legal right 
to initiate a foreclosure action, without more, does not give rise to a tort claim for the resulting 
distress that appellants may have experienced from the potential loss of a home. O'Farrell v. 
Schaver, 1990 Cal. App. Lexis 606 (1990). (Pursuing the legal remedy of foreclosure of Trust 
Deed was not "extreme and outrageous conduct." Plaintiff had no claim for infliction of 
emotional distress.) See also, DuBois v. Grand Central. 872 P.2d 1073, 1078 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (Mere discharge from employment does not rise to level of improper conduct by employer. 
"The mere fact of DuBois's discharge, coupled with the fact that the discharge may have been 
based on incorrect information, does not rise to the level of outrageous or intolerable conduct 
necessary to establish a prima facie claim of emotional distress.") See also, Viestenz v. Fleming 
Companies. 681 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir.), cert denied. 459 U. S.972, 103 S. Ct. 303 (1982) 
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(dismissal of a claim for intentional infliction of distress where harm resulted from fact of 
discharge rather than improper conduct.); and Beck v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 
795, 800 (Utah 1985) (without more, a breach of implied or express contractual duties gives rise 
to a cause of action in contract, not in tort.) 
E. Recordation of a Notice of Default Does Not Create a Cause of 
Action for Slander of Title or for Defamation. 
In their Brief, appellants correctly recite the four elements of slander of title. 
First, there must be a publication of a slanderous statement (one that is derogatory or injurious 
to the legal validity of an owner's title); second, the statement must be false; third, the statement 
must have been made with malice; and, fourth, the statement must cause actual or special 
damages. See Point VI of Appellants' Brief. 
Appellants did not present any facts to support the first, second, or fourth elements 
of a claim for slander of title. 
Addressing the first element, there is no evidence of any publication of the notice 
of default other than the fact it was recorded with the county recorder. Appellants did not 
present testimony of any witness who saw the notice of default. See Statement of Undisputed 
Facts No. 24. In an attempt to prove a publication, appellants argue that the recordation of the 
notice of default with the Utah County Recorder is sufficient;7 however, the recording of a 
notice of default, like the recording of a lis pendens, is privileged. 
7
 No evidence was presented to the trial court that a notice of default to initiate a non-
judicial foreclosure was actually recorded with the county recorder; however, for purposes of this 
appeal, appellee acknowledges that a notice of default was recorded. 
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When appellee filed its counterclaim to foreclose the real property, it was 
statutorily authorized to file a lis pendens. Utah Code Ann.. § 78-40-2. Recording a lis pendens 
is absolutely privileged and gives no rise to a cause of action for slander of title. Hansen v. 
Kohler. 550 P.2d 186, 189-190 (Utah 1976). 
The sole purpose of recording a notice of lis pendens is to 
give constructive notice of the pendency of the proceeding; its only 
foundation is the action filed—it has no existence independent of it. 
The clear weight of authority describing the office of a lis 
pendens is well stated in Albertson v. Raboff. [195 P.2d 405 (Cal. 
1956)] wherein the court reasoned that since the effect of a lis 
pendens is to give constructive notice of all the facts apparent on 
the face of the pleadings, the recordation of a notice of lis pendens 
is, in effect, a republication of the pleadings. Since the publication 
of the pleadings is absolutely privileged, the republication thereof 
by recording a notice of lis pendens is similarly privileged. The 
court said: 
It would be anomalous to hold that a litigant 
is privileged to make a publication necessary to 
bring an action but that he can be sued for 
defamation if he lets anyone know that he has 
brought it, [citation omitted] particularly where he 
is expressly authorized by statute to let all the world 
know that he has brought it. . . . 
In the instant action, Hansen's recordation of a lis pendens 
was absolutely privileged and the action of Pierce for slander of 
title cannot be sustained. 
Had U. S. Bancorp elected to first initiate a judicial foreclosure, the appellants 
clearly would not have had any action for slander of title since the recordation of a lis pendens 
to effectuate a judicial foreclosure is absolutely privileged. The same premise applies to 
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nonjudicial foreclosures which require the recordation of a notice of default. Note the following 
quotation from Restatement, Torts, § 638, quoted by the Utah Supreme Court in Hansen: 
A party to a private litigation . . . has an absolute privilege 
to disparage another's property in or the quality of his land, 
chattels, or intangible things in the institution of or during the 
course and as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he partici-
pates if the disparagement has some correlation thereto. 
Hansen. 550 P.2d 189-90. 
Like a notice of lis pendens, the sole purpose of a notice of default is to give 
constructive notice of the pendency of a foreclosure proceeding. Constructive notice is required 
whether foreclosure is done judicially or non-judicially. Compare Utah Code Ann.. § 78-40-2 
and § 57-1-24(1). 
This Court should hold that the simple recordation of a notice of default, absent 
any other evidence, is absolutely privileged as a statutory requirement for a trust deed 
foreclosure. Accordingly, appellants have failed to show a non-privileged publication slandering 
their title to real property. 
Appellants have also not provided any evidence that the statements made in the 
notice of default were false; therefore, the second element of slander of title also fails. 
Finally, there is no proof of any actual or special damages incurred by appellants. 
To the contrary, the only evidence of real estate value indicates an offer—which was rejected-for 
full value even though the notice of default was recorded. See Statement of Undisputed Facts 
No. 27. Slander of title requires proof of actual or special damages. First Security Bank v. 
Banberry Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989). 
28 
The claim for defamation also fails, since appellants can only prove publication 
through constructive notice. Appellants have no witness who actually saw or heard a publication, 
privileged or otherwise. 
The court properly granted appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment since 
appellants were unable to proffer evidence on the morning of trial to establish their varied 
claims. Summary Judgment should be affirmed. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED ATTORNEY 
FEES FOR DEFENDING AGAINST APPELLANTS' CLAIMS. 
Appellants filed this action and a prior action to hinder appellee's contractual right 
to foreclose real property. The crux of each and every cause of action initiated by appellants is 
the Credit Agreement between the parties. The claimed misrepresentations were wholly related 
to use of the credit line. (Amended Complaint, 1 33) (R. 46) Appellants claimed that appellee 
was estopped from denying use of the credit line. (Amended Complaint, f 1 49, 50) (R. 44) 
Appellants claim appellee anticipatorily breached the credit line. (Amended Complaint, f % 53-
55) (R. 44) Appellants contend that appellee intentionally or negligently inflicted emotional 
distress by refusing to honor use of the credit line. (Amended Complaint, 11 62-67) (R. 42, 
43) Appellants claim for defamation of credit "was entirely due to the anticipatory breach of U. 
S. Bancorp." (Amended Complaint, 1 70) (R. 42) Appellants' claims of defamation and 
slander of title arose out of a notice of default recorded to enforce the Agreement. (Amended 
Complaint, Iff 73 and 79) (R. 40-41) Appellants' claim of breach of fiduciary duty results from 
a claimed violation of the credit line. (Amended Complaint, 1 83) (R. 40) Finally, appellants' 
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LICO claim asserts improper foreclosure of the credit line and trust deed. (Amended Complaint, 
93) (R. 39) 
Both the Deed of Trust (R. 93) and the Credit Agreement (R. 95) detail appellee's 
ntitlement to attorneys' fees. The Deed of Trust provides "this Deed of Trust secures the 
erformance of the Credit Agreement, . . . the payment of all interest, late charges, membership 
ees, attorneys' fees (including any on appeal), collections costs and all other amounts that are 
>ayable to beneficiary at any time under the Credit Agreement. . . . " Paragraph 16 of the Credit 
Agreement states: "If you do not make any payment when it is due, you agree to pay us 
easonable amounts permitted by law that we spend trying to collect what you owe us or trying 
o take, foreclose or sell any property that secures loans under this account. You also will pay 
easonable attorneys' fees, including any for appeals, which we pay to any attorney who is not 
i salaried employee of ours." (R. 94) The attorneys' fees incurred by appellee were required 
0 establish its contractual rights. Appellants improperly impeded the exercise of appellee's legal 
ights, ultimately failing on every cause. 
In Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court remanded 
1 case for a determination of attorney fees associated with a successful defense against efforts 
o rescind a contract, even though such efforts were not a significant portion of the overall 
awsuit. In Trayner v. Cushing. 688 P. 856 (Utah 1984) the Utah Supreme Court held that both 
>arties were entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to the contract where each had rights under the 
igreement that were denied by the other, each was required to take legal action to enforce the 
igreement, and each was successful on one or more points and unsuccessful on others. In the 
:ase now before the Court, appellants claimed to have rights under the contract and each of the 
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parties took legal action in an attempt to enforce the agreement in one or more particulars. Only 
appellee was successful in defense and prosecution of the claims. The trial court erred in failing 
to grant an award of reasonable attorneys' fees for Mr. Drake's services in defending against the 
appellants' claims, and in reducing the fee for Mr. Elggren's services which were not expressly 
related to foreclosing the Trust Deed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment, but reverse the court's 
denial of attorneys' fees to appellee, remanding the case for a determination of fees incurred not 
only on appeal but also in efforts of both Mssrs. Drake and Elggren to defend the claims made 
by appellant. 
DATED this *5j«*l day of March, 1995. 
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
Michael W. Homer, Esq. 
H. Michael Drake, Esq. 
Co-Counsel for Appellee and Cross-Appellant U.S. 
Bancorp 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be served two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant U.S. Bancorp by depositing the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, this -51^ day of March, 1995, to the following: 
Robert L. Moody, Esq. 
TAYLOR, MOODY AND THORNE 
Counsel for Appellants Steven C. 
and Kristi A. Davis 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Country Club Court 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN C. DAVIS and KRISTI ] 
A. DAVIS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
U. S. BANCORP MORTGAGE 
COMPANY, formerly U. S. 
BANCORP REAL ESTATE SERVICES, ] 
formerly U. S. THRIFT & LOAN, ] 
a corporation authorized to ] 
do business in Utah, and H. ] 
CLYDE DAVIS, ] 
Defendants. 
i ORDER GRANTING U.S. BANCORP'S | MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 Case No. 920400802 
I Honorable Guy R. Burningham 
Oral argument on U.S. Bancorp's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was heard on Monday, January 3, 1994. During oral argument, 
counsel for U.S. Bancorp objected to the statement of disputed 
facts presented in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, contending that the wording of the 
three proposed disputed facts was not consistent with the 
references to the record. 
Having reviewed the Memorandum filed by the parties and the 
references to the record, and having considered oral arguments of 
counsel and good cause appearing, it is ordered that defendant U.S. 
Bancorp's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Plaintiffs' 
first cause of action alleging misrepresentation, the second cause 
of action alleging estoppel, the third cause of action alleging 
anticipatory breach of contract, the fifth cause of action alleging 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the seventh cause of 
action for defamation and the eighth cause of action for slander of 
title are dismissed with prejudice. Inasmuch as plaintiffs' other 
causes of action have already been dismissed by stipulation and 
order, plaintiffs' Complaint is now fully dismissed with prejudice. 
Mr. Drake offered to present testimony about his attorney's 
fees. The Court finds that the plaintiffs' action was not brought 
in bad faith and therefore Mr. Drake would not be entitled to 
attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. The Court further 
finds that the attorney's fees associated with Mr. Drake's legal 
services in defending the claims brought by plaintiffs would not be 
of the type that are recoverable under Paragraph 16 of the 
Revolving Credit Agreement executed by the plaintiffs in favor of 
U.S. Bancorp; therefore, Mr. Drake's fees expended in defense of 
this action are not recoverable under the contract between the 
parties. 
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Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a), the Court is 
required to provide a brief statement of the grounds for this 
decision. 
A. Misrepresentation and Estoppel 
There was no evidence presented to the Court to prove the 
content or context of any statements made by Chris Wold or any 
other officer or employee of the defendant that would amount to a 
misrepresentation upon which plaintiffs could reasonably rely to 
their detriment. Although the plaintiffs presented evidence about 
their understanding of what would happen after making a $19,000 
payment to U.S. Bancorp, there was no evidence presented as to any 
actual statement made by an employee of U.S. Bancorp that mislead 
the plaintiffs and/or Clyde Davis. Based on the lack of competent 
evidence to prove any erroneous statement, the Court need not 
address the issue of damages. 
B. Breach of Contract 
The contract between the parties expressly provides that U.S. 
Bancorp without notice may refuse to make additional advances. See 
Paragraph 10 of the Revolving Credit Agreement. The defendant was 
under no contractual obligation to leave the credit line open, 
c. negligent Inflictipn of Emotional pistress 
The plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that any officer 
or manager of a corporation can bind the corporation through his 
actions and that a corporation is responsible for tortious conduct 
of management personnel. Plaintiffs are also correct that once a 
f. \ma%\ngtac\ 1 hnxftbaacorp. pO 1 
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corporation obtains knowledge of certain facts through one officer 
or employee
 # a new officer is not excused if he is uninformed of 
facts known to a prior officer or employee. Although the 
undisputed facts establish that Mr. Chris Wold did not have any 
personal knowledge of events in the lives of the plaintiffs, the 
corporation would be responsible for whatever knowledge other 
employees may have had. 
Although the corporation may have had notice of plaintiffs' 
emotional condition, a cause of action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress requires some unreasonable action by the claimed 
tortfeasor. As stated in Session 313 of the Restatement Second of 
Torts, an actor must realize that his conduct involves an 
unreasonable risk of causing the distress. Based on the undisputed 
facts presented to the Court, even if employees of U.S. Bancorp 
with actual knowledge of the plaintiffs' emotional condition had 
proceeded with foreclosure actions, there is no evidence to support 
a claim that these foreclosure activities amounted to conduct that 
involved an unreasonable risk of causing distress as claimed by 
plaintiffs. There is no evidence that U.S. Bancorp or its 
employees acted unreasonably. 
D. DEFAMATION 
Defamation requires a publication containing statements which 
are not true made to a third party deliberately or in reckless 
disregard of the truth. There is no competent admissible evidence 
that there has been a publication. In his arguments, counsel for 
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the plaintiffs stated that there was a buzz around the neighborhood 
about notices that were allegedly posted by U.S. Bancorp; however, 
there is no witness who can come forward and state that he or she 
has actually seen such a notice• The buzz around the neighborhood 
may have come from plaintiffs' own statements to neighbors and 
family. The Court has not been given any evidence of publication 
of alleged defamatory comments. Because there has been no evidence 
of publication, the Court need not reach the issue of whether the 
notice of default itself amounts to a defamatory statement. 
E. SIANPEP QF TITLE 
Slander of title requires proof of actual damages incurred by 
the plaintiffs. There has been no evidence presented to the Court 
to support a claim of actual damages of any sum certain sustained 
as a result of any notice of foreclosure of notice of default or 
lis pendens having been filed with the Utah County Recorder. A 
finder of fact would have to speculate to determine any actual 
damages as a result of the alleged slander of title. Since there 
is no competent evidence offered of actual damages resulting from 
the alleged slander of title, the^claim fails. 
DATED this « day of January/ 19i 
/€. 
Judge Guy R. Burningham 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Richard C. Coxson, Esq. 
Stephen B. Elggren, Esq. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING U.S. BANCORP'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT by depositing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, this O day of January, 1994, to the 
following: 
Richard C. Coxson, Esq. 
275 North Main Street 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Stephen B. Elggren, Esq. 
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE 
2469 E. Fort Union Boulevard, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121-3343 
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Defendant U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Company respectfully submits this Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Solely for purposes of this Motion for Summary Judgment, U. S. Bancorp concedes that 
the following facts are undisputed. 
A. Facts Relevant to All Causes of Action 
1. Kristi A. Davis and H. Clyde Davis are owners of real property in Highland, 
Utah, located at 9866 North Meadow Lane, described as Lot 28 Plat A Pheasant Hollow PUD 
(the "real property"). (Amended Complaint, 15.) 
2. Steven C. Davis is the husband of Kristi Davis and does not own any interest in 
the real property. (Amended Complaint, 16; Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 25:7-11, p. 50:12 
through p. 51:9.) 
3. Kristi Davis, Clyde Davis and Steven Davis obtained a credit line from 
U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Company, formerly known as U. S. Bancorp Real Estate Services and 
U. S. Thrift & Loan. The line of credit is secured by the real property. (U. S. Credit Line 
Revolving Credit Agreement and Disclosure; U. S. Thrift & Loan deed of trust recorded in 
Book 2318 beginning at page 459 of the Utah County Recorder's Office.) 
4. The Davises have not made a withdrawal from the credit line since March 1987. 
(Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 109:17-24.) 
5. On June 17, 1991, $19,000 was paid to U. S. Bancorp. The $19,000 was 
obtained from funds belonging to Clyde Davis. (Steven Davis Deposition, p. 56:1-5.) 
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6. The Davises have not made a payment on the account since September 1991. 
(Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 71:6-18.) 
7. After the $19,000 payment was made, Steven Davis' doctor told him to get on 
with life and go back to school, (Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 77:21-25.) 
B. Facts Relevant to First and Second Causes of Action (Misrepresentation and Estoppel) 
8. Plaintiffs claim that Chris Wold made certain representations to them regarding 
the use of the credit line after the $19,000 payment, and that U. S. Bancorp has wrongfully 
refused to allow withdrawals on the line of credit. 
9. From the deposition of Steven Davis (p. 61:20 through p. 62:14): 
Q: Tell me as close as you can exactly what Chris Wold said 
about reopening the line of credit. 
A: Well, he said, "This will go towards the principal in your 
line of credit." And I says, "How long is this line of credit 
still good?" 
And he says, "Oh, for many, many years, I'm sure you 
can—I'm sure in the worst case that you have to do, you 
can sell your house and pay your dad back the $20,000 and 
pay us off." 
* * * * 
It was, let's get you going, get you back up. But I've been 
doing this for Bert Wilson for years, telling him and paying 
him. 
10. The only damages claimed by plaintiffs as a result of the alleged misrepresenta-
tions were: "Plaintiffs were forced to take out a student loan and incurred additional interest 
charges" (Amended Complaint, 142); post-traumatic stress syndrome (Response to Interrogatory 
No. 7); damaged social relations with neighbors (Response to Interrogatory No. 7); extreme 
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disruption of family life (Response to Interrogatory No. 7); and lost wages due to setback for 
post-traumatic stress syndrome and time required to fight this action (Response to Interrogatory 
No. 7). 
11. From the deposition of Clyde Davis (September 1992, p. 19:8-11): 
Q: Did you have any discussions about the use of that line of 
credit after that time or-
A: No, they were so happy to get the money. I didn't talk to 
him about it. 
12. From the deposition of Clyde Davis (September 1992, p. 22:16 through p. 23:21): 
Q: Did you discuss with anyone at U. S. Bancorp whether 
Steve could draw on that credit line again after making a 
payment of $20,000? 
A: Well, it was my understanding that— I said the line of 
credit, and it remained the same, and that was basically--
that was my intent and that was my understanding. 
Q: Was that ever discussed with anyone at U. S. Bancorp? 
A: Whoever I had talked to and told them I'd pay the $20,000. 
Q: So what did you tell him that made you have that under-
standing? 
A: Oh, that it would go on. Just like this $20,000 was just a 
continuation, that it was to work, it just reduced the line of 
credit and everything would be the same. I assumed then 
that there would be less payments too that they'd be asking 
on a monthly basis. 
Q: Was there any discussion about those monthly payments? 
A: As I say, they were just happy to have the $20,000. 
Q: And what I'm grasping from your conversation, that there 
wasn't any real discussion about what would happen to the 
credit line after the $20,000 was paid, whether there was 
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going to be any further reduction or if it was just going to 
be Steve's obligation or whether he could draw on the 
account. 
A: Well, I told them I was helping him out on his line of 
credit and I paid $20,000, and it was my assumption and 
theirs, that it would go on just like it was, and the $20,000 
was so Fd quit receiving a lot of letters from them. Maybe 
I shouldn't say that, that was in jest. 
C Facts Relevant to Third Cause of Action (Anticipatory Breach) 
13. Plaintiffs claim damages arising from being unable to withdraw funds to use for 
education costs and to pay back to U. S. Bancorp as payments on account. 
14. Prior to 1991, the Davises from time to time would withdraw funds from the line 
of credit and repay those funds within a few days as a payment on account. This occasional 
practice was sometimes with discussed with Bert Wilson, a former U. S. Bancorp employee. 
(Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 52:12 through p. 55:25.) 
15. Because Steven Davis could not withdraw funds from the credit line, he had to 
take out student loans of approximately $2,500. While he was in school he did not have to pay 
any interest on the student loans. Mr. Davis does not know the interest rate on the student loans 
or if the interest rate is less than or more than the interest on the credit line. (Deposition of 
Steven Davis, p. 81:5-24.) 
16. In January or February 1992, Steven Davis received approximately $2,000 for 
costs of education at UVCC for classes beginning in the fall of 1991. (Deposition of Steven 
Davis, p. 37:15-38 through 38:3. 
17. As a claimed anticipatory breach of contract, plaintiffs claim to have suffered the 
following damages: 
5 
a. Post-traumatic stress syndrome (Response to Interrogatory No. 10); 
b. Damaged social relations with neighbors (Response to Interrogatory No. 
10); 
c. Extreme disruption of family life (Response to Interrogatory No. 10); and 
d. Lost wages due to post-traumatic stress syndrome (Response to 
Interrogatory No. 10). 
D. Facts Relevant to Fifth Cause of Action (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress) 
18. Prior to 1991, Steven Davis dealt with Mr. Bert Wilson, a U. S. Bancorp 
employee. Mr. Davis had a comfortable relationship with Bert Wilson, who knew very much 
about the Davises' personal situation during that period of time. (Deposition of Steven Davis, 
p. 51:10 through p. 52:11.) 
19. At the time the $19,000 payment was made to U. S. Bancorp, Chris Wold had 
only been working on the Davis account for a few months and was a "newcomer" on the account 
and situation. (Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 56:1-22). 
20. Prior to paying the $19,000, Steven Davis had met with Chris Wold a total of 
four times, two in person and two by telephone. (Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 57:18 through 
p. 58:12.) 
21. Steven Davis made these statements to Chris Wold: "Do not foreclose on us, 
we're in the middle of this adoption situation" and "You people have known it for a long time" 
and "Well, I've got two options to do this, I can make the $500 monthly payments on interest 
only and keep you current and all like that, or what Fd like to do is pay down the principal so 
my interest payments are only $300 a month. So what I'm able to do is cut it down so your 
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credit line is not maxed and I've got several more months in the litigation of this adoption case." 
(Deposition of Steven Davis, p. 59:3-5, 9-16.) 
22. There is no evidence that Chris Wold knew anything about the Davises' emotional 
condition during his dealings with them. 
23. Plaintiffs have not identified damages they have suffered for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress. (There has been no response to Interrogatory No. 12.) Assuming 
arguendo that plaintiffs' damages would be the same for this cause of action as for other causes 
of action, plaintiffs claim to lhave suffered: 
a. Post-traumatic stress syndrome; 
b. Damaged social relations with neighbors; 
c. Extreme disruption of family life; and 
d. Lost wages due to post-traumatic stress syndrome and time required to 
fight this action. 
E. Facts Relevant to Seventh Cause of Action (Defamation) 
24. No witness ever saw any notice posted by U. S. Bancorp. (Deposition of 
Annabelle Davis, p. 5:3-6; deposition of Craig Walkenhorst, p. 14:2-5; deposition of Cheree 
Davis, p. 9:8-12; deposition of Rita Nelson, p. 11:10-15; deposition of Mona Lunceford, p. 
10:13-23; deposition of Deborah Jean Kofford, p. 13:9 through p. 14:19.) 
25. The damages that plaintiffs allegedly suffered to their business and social 
reputations are: 
a. Post-traumatic stress syndrome (Response to Interrogatory No. 14); 
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b. Damaged social relations with neighbors (Response to Interrogatory No. 
14); 
c. Extreme disruption of family life (Response to Interrogatory No. 14); and 
d. Lost wages due to setback for post-traumatic stress syndrome and time 
required to fight this action (Response to Interrogatory No. 14). 
F. Facts Relevant to Eighth Cause of Action (Slander of Title) 
26. The plaintiffs did not respond to Interrogatory No. 15, which asked, 
In paragraph 81 of your Complaint, you allege that "U. S. 
Bancorp's actions have affected adversely the stable value of the 
property." State with particularity all facts to support these 
allegations. 
27. The Davises cannot prove any special damages resulting from any document being 
recorded with the Utah County Recorder. To the contrary, Joseph Jennings testified as follows: 
Q: Okay. Other than the one earnest money agreement, did 
you have any other people present any earnest money, or 
any offer on the home? 
A: After it was withdrawn, I had someone who said they'd 
pay full—I did not have someone tell me, I had an agent in 
our office tell us that they had somebody that would be 
quite interested in the house, could we go back and sell it. 
And so I called Mr. Davis and he said, "No, we're not 
going to sell at this point in time." And so that was strictly 
verbal, never-there was never any additional offers that 
came in. 
Q: Who was the agent in your office? 
A: Ken Glen. 
Q: And did he tell you about how much would be offered if 
the opportunity was given? 
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A: He said full price, and the full price was, like I said, the 
$189,000 or $189,900 and I don't know if the people had 
seen the home or anything at that point in time. 
Deposition of Joseph P. Jennings, p. 9. 
28. The damages allegedly suffered by plaintiffs for slander of title are: 
a. Post-traumatic stress syndrome (Response to Interrogatory No, 16); 
b. Damaged social relations with neighbors (Response to Interrogatory No. 
16); 
c. Extreme disruption of family life (Response to Interrogatory No. 16); and 
d. Lost wages due to setback for post-traumatic stress syndrome and time 
required to fight this action (Response to Interrogatory No. 16). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFFS CANNOT SUSTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR MISREPRESENTATION. 
The elements of misrepresentation are: (1) A representation was made, (2) concerning 
a presently existing material fact, (3) which was false, (4) which the representor either (a) knew 
to be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to 
base such a representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, (6) that 
the other party acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it, (8) 
and was thereby induced to act, (9) to his injury and damage. Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 
247 P.2d 273, 274 (1952), restated in Schuhman v. Green River Motel. 835 P.2d 992, 994 
(Utah 1992). 
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Both intentional and negligent misrepresentation must be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence. Jardine v. Brunswick Corp.. 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 663 (1967). "Clear and 
convincing evidence" is evidence that produces a firm belief, and must at least have reached the 
point where there remains no substantial doubt as to the truth or correctness of the conclusion 
based upon the evidence. See MUJI 2.19. The clear and convincing standard carries with it not 
only the burden to persuade but also has the element of clinching the truth or in the mind of the 
fact finder. Clear and convincing proof clinches that which is otherwise only probable to the 
mind. 
The undisputed facts which plaintiffs can present in support of their claims for 
misrepresentation cannot sustain a claim for misrepresentation. Despite numerous requests in 
deposition and interrogatories, the plaintiffs are not able to articulate the exact misrepresentation 
Chris Wold made. Clyde Davis didn't even talk to Chris Wold about use of the line of credit 
after payment of the $19,000 and simply made assumptions about what might happen after 
payment. Kristi Davis had no contact with Chris Wold, and Steve Davis testified that Chris 
Wold's representation included a statement to the effect that if worse came to worse the Davises 
could sell their home to pay the loan. Such evidence does not amount to misrepresentation. 
Further, a misrepresentation must be of a "presently existing material fact." No statement which 
plaintiffs claim was made by Chris Wold deals with a presently existing material fact. 
The plaintiffs cannot prove damages arising out the misrepresentation. Plaintiffs are not 
prepared to present any evidence about the additional costs of student loans, if any, over costs 
associated with additional withdrawals from the line of credit. The claimed lost wages have 
never been specified with particularity and so are not recoverable, and damages such as stress, 
10 
damaged social relations, and disruption of family life are not recoverable in a fraud action. The 
purpose of a fraud action is to return a party to status quo ante and emotional damages are not 
recoverable. Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau. Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Other consequential monetary damages must be proven with particularity. ONG International 
(U.S.A^ Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corporation, 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). 
n. 
PLAINTIFFS ARE UNABLE TO PROVE THEIR 
CLAIM OF ESTOPPEL. 
Estoppel.. . is a doctrine which precludes parties from asserting 
their rights where their actions or conduct render it inequitable to 
allow them to assert those rights. 
The doctrine of estoppel has been set forth by this court as 
follows: 
This doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by his 
acts, representations, or conduct, or by his silence when he 
ought to speak, induces another to believe certain facts 
exist and such other relies thereon to his detriment. 
Hunter v. Hunter. 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983). 
Estoppel requires (1) proof of a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party 
that is inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) other party's reasonable action or inaction 
based upon first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to second 
party that would result from allowing first party to contradict or repudiate the statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act. Van der Heyde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co.. 845 P.2d 275 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Estoppel must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Financial Corp. of America 
v. Prudential Carbon & Ribbon Co.. 507 P.2d 1026, 1028, 29 Utah 2d 238 (1973). 
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The U. S. Credit Line Agreement states that the Davises would be in default if they did 
not pay U. S. Bancorp when required to and in the event of default, U. S. Bancorp "may cancel 
this account without notice to you and we may require you immediately to pay us all amounts 
you owe us. We also may reduce your credit limit or refuse to make additional advances." 
This written agreement allowed U. S. Bancorp to close the line of credit, and indeed no 
withdrawals have been made by the Davises since March 1987. Plaintiffs claim that U. S. 
Bancorp somehow agreed to reopen that line of credit and they should be estopped from refusing 
to make additional advances. 
Plaintiffs' estoppel claim is barred by the statute of fraud. This is exactly the type of 
alleged representation contemplated by Utah Code Annotated §25-5-4(6), and since there is no 
writing to document U. S. Bancorp's claimed agreement to reopen the credit line, such a claim 
is void. 
Utah Code Annotated §25-5-4(6) provides: 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some 
note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the 
party to be charged with the agreement: 
* * * * 
(6) Every credit agreement. 
"Credit agreement" is defined as "agreement by a financial institution to . . . delay or 
otherwise modify an obligation to repay money, . . . or to make any other financial accommoda-
tion." Certainly, U. S. Bancorp's alleged promise to reopen a line of credit or accept delayed 
or reduced payments constitutes a "credit agreement." Section 25-5-4(6)(b) expressly provides 
that "a debtor or a creditor may not maintain an action on a credit agreement unless the 
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agreement is in writing, expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms and conditions, 
and is signed by the party against whom enforcement of the agreement is sought." 
ffl. 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CLAIM FOR ANTICIPATORY 
BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
An anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an executory contract manifests a positive 
and unequivocal intent not to render performance when the time fixed for performance is due. 
The other party can immediately treat the anticipatory repudiation as a breach or it can continue 
to treat the contract as operable and urge performance without waiving any right to sue for that 
repudiation. Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson. 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1992). 
In Kasco, the Supreme Court stated: 
We need not decide here whether Benson's announcement that he 
did not intend to abide by the non-competition covenant was an 
anticipatory repudiation. It makes no difference in this case. If 
his remarks were an anticipatory repudiation. Kasco simply had an 
election. It could treat the remark as a breach, or it could 
continue to treat the contract as operable and encourage perform-
ance without waiving any rights under the contract. If there was 
no anticipatory repudiation, the non-competition covenant remained 
in full force. 
& 
Anticipatory repudiation is not a cause of action but rather is a legal ground for the non-
breaching party to make an election. In this case, U. S. Bancorp anticipatorily breached the 
agreement, the Davises would have to elect their remedies. There has been no election, and a 
claim for anticipatory breach is meaningless and moot. 
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IV. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT CHRIS WOLD HAD SUFFICIENT 
KNOWLEDGE OF PLAINTIFFS* CONDITION TO FIND HIM 
NEGLIGENT IN INFLICTING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
In 1988, the Utah Supreme Court recognized a claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. SfiS Johnson v. Rogers. 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), The court adopted the "zone of 
danger" rule in found in section 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides: 
If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he 
is subject to liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily 
harm if the actor (a) should have realized that his conduct involved 
an unreasonable risk of causing the distress . . . and (b) from facts 
known to himf should have realized that the distress, if it were 
caused, might result in illness or bodily harm. 
The plaintiffs have no witnesses to testify that Chris Wold knew any facts about the plaintiffs' 
emotional condition and that he should have realized that his representations involved an 
unreasonable risk of causing distress based on facts known to him. 
Although plaintiffs claim they were rebounding from an emotionally difficult time in their 
lives due to adoption and financial problems, Chris Wold knew nothing of their post-traumatic 
stress syndrome. Kristi Davis had minimal contact with Chris Wold. Steve Davis has only had 
four meetings with Mr. Wold, two by telephone and two by person. Clyde Davis has only 
spoken with Chris Wold by phone and he himself does not make any claim of emotional distress. 
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V. 
PLAINTIFFS CANNOT PROVE THEIR 
CLAIM FOR DEFAMATION. 
A key element of defamation is "publication." Plaintiffs do not have any witness to 
prove their allegation that U. S. Bancorp plastered notices throughout their neighborhood. Not 
one witness saw any notice. The witnesses can only establish that Steve Davis or a member of 
his family told the witnesses about alleged actions by U. S. Bancorp. 
VI. 
PLAINTIFFS CANNOT PROVE SLANDER OF TITLE. 
To prove slander of title, the claimant must prove that there was a publication of a 
slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title, that statement was false, that statement was 
made with malice, and that statement caused actual or special damages. Affirmative proof of 
malice sufficient to support a claim for slander of title requires a showing that the wrong was 
done with intent to injure, vex, or annoy. For purposes of proving slander of title, malice may 
be implied where a party knowingly or wrongfully records or publishes something untrue or 
spurious, or gives false or misleading impression adverse to one's title under circumstances that 
slanderer should reasonably foresee might result in damage to owner of property. 
Slander of title requires proof of actual or special damages. First Security Bank v. 
Banberry Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989). In rejecting a claim of slander of title brought 
by Banberry, the Supreme Court stated: 
Additionally, while Banberry may have proved presumed or 
general damages, that is not enough. A slander of title action 
requires proof of actual or special damages. 
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The plaintiffs do not have any witness to testify about the value of their property being 
affected by the legal notice of default filed by U. S. Bancorp. They do not have admissible 
competent evidence to support their claim that they could not sell the property for full value. 
Instead, the testimony of their listing agent indicates that Mr. Davis unilaterally decided not to 
sell his home despite a potential offer for full value. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the limited disclosures made by plaintiffs in response to discovery requests from 
U. S. Bancorp, there is insufficient evidence to support the claims asserted by plaintiffs. U. S. 
Bancorp should be granted summary judgment in its favor on all claims brought by the plaintiffs, 
dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice and allowing U. S. Bancorp to proceed with the 
third party action to foreclose the note and mortgage. 
DATED this > V - day of December, 1993. 
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON 
Michael W. Homer, Esq. " ^ 
H. Michael Drake, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
16 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by depositing 
the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this %&" day of December, 1993, to 
the following: 
Richard C. Coxson, Esq. 
275 North Main Street 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Stephen B. Elggren, Esq. 
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE 
2469 E. Fort Union Boulevard, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121-3343 
and via facsimile to: 
Richard C. Coxson, Esq. 
(801) 798-9801 
•ua^ 
ImxBS.l 
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Attorney for Plaintiffs 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
(801) 798-3574 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN C. DAVIS, and KRISTI A. ] 
DAVIS, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
U.S. BANCORP MORTGAGE CO., formerly] 
U.S. BANCORP REAL ESTATE SERVICES, ] 
INC., formerly U.S. BANK, ] 
formerly U.S. THRIFT & LOAN, a ] 
Corporation authorized to do ] 
business in Utah, H. CLYDE DAVIS, ] 
Defendants. 
) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
1 TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
1 JUDGMENT 
l Civil No. 920400802 
DISPUTED FACTS 
1. Bert Wilson, an agent of U.S. Bancorp, had full knowledge 
of the Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome suffered by the Davises. See 
Deposition of Steve Davis, Page 51, Line 10 through Page 52, Line 
11 and paragraph 18 of undisputed facts of defendant. 
2. Clyde Davis was told that the credit line would continue 
to be open. See Deposition of Clyde Davis, September 9, 1992, Page 
24, Line 14 through Line 19. 
3. The twenty thousand dollars would never have been paid if 
the credit line had not been considered to be open. See Deposition 
of Clyde Davis, Page 28, Line 19 through Line 23. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS IMPROPER WHEN A GENUINE ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT EXISTS. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides in material part as 
follows: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions of file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
In as much as genuine issues of material fact exist in this 
matter, summary judgment is improper. See Young v. Felornia, 121 
Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862 Cert.Denied 344 U.S. 886, 73 S.Ct.186, 97 
L.Ed. 685 (1952); Ruffinenqo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978). 
This court should deny summary judgment in as much as the evidence 
is disputed. 
II. U.S. BANCORP HAD FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONDITION OF STEVE 
AND KRISTI DAVIS. 
It is Black Letter Law that the knowledge of an agent is 
imputed to the principal. The courts in Utah have had occasion to 
address this point. In Lowe v. April Industries, Inc. , 531 P.2d 
1297 (Utah 1974), the court held that: 
As this concerns the law of corporations, knowledge of 
the entity is imputed to it from the knowledge possessed 
by its officers and agents. Lowe, 531 P.2d at 1299. 
The court had further occasion to address a situation 
substantially similar to the present one wherein personnel changes 
brought into question the actual notice received by a corporation 
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of existing facts. In Microbiological Research Corporation v. MUNA, 
625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981) the court held that: 
A corporation, being once charged with notice of the 
character of a transaction continues to be effected by 
such notice whatever changes may occur in the personnel 
of its working force. Microbiological Research, 625 P.2d 
at 695. 
Bert Wilson, a management employee of U.S. Bancorp, had full 
knowledge of the personal situation of the Davises. See Deposition 
of Steve Davis, Page 51, Line 10 through Page 52, Line 11 and 
Paragraph 18 of undisputed facts of Defendant. The knowledge of 
Bert Wilson constituted notice to U.S. Bancorp, and their 
inadequate internal procedures for passing on information from one 
agent to another does not relieve them of notice of the condition 
of the Davises. To hold otherwise would be to encourage 
corporations to intentionally suppress internal knowledge of facts 
which may be unwanted, as the facts in this case are. It is against 
public policy to encourage the violation of individual rights 
through willful ignorance, and as such the knowledge of Bert Wilson 
is in fact imputed to U.S. Bancorp and all of its agents dealing 
with the Davises. 
III. THE CREDIT LINE WAS RETURNED TO GOOD STANDING. 
Defendants have correctly stated that clear and convincing 
evidence must exist to show misrepresentation and estoppel. The 
question exists as to what the nature of the misrepresentation was, 
and in what way the Davises changed their position. 
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The change of position is obvious. A nineteen thousand dollar 
pay down on the credit line was made on June 17, 1991. See 
Paragraph 5 of Undisputed Facts of Defendant. The change of 
position that occurred necessary for an estoppel is clear from the 
Deposition of Clyde Davis. He stated that: 
He, (Chris Wold) was eager to get twenty thousand and he 
was willing to do a lot of things if I told him that I 
would pay twenty thousand. And this doesn't have any 
meaning as far as I am concerned, (June 7, 1991 letter 
received from U.S. Bancorp) because when I paid that, why 
it was to continue on that line of credit or Ifd have 
never of paid it. Or we'd have -- well, I'd never had 
paid it if that hadn't have been the understanding. 
Deposition of Clyde Davis, September 9, 1992, Page 28, 
Lines 18-23. 
The Davises changed position by making a draw down payment of 
nineteen thousand dollars. The acts of Clyde Davis are not 
consistent with complying with the terms of the letter sent by 
defendant on June 7, 1991 which simply asked for interest payments 
and a pay off in full in August of 1991. See Exhibit 7 to 
Deposition of Clyde Davis September 9, 1992) There was no 
obligation to make a pay down on the line of credit if the 
intention had been simply to comply with the June 7, 1991 letter. 
(See Exhibit 7 to Deposition of Clyde Davis, September 9, 1992). 
The combination of a positive act of the magnitude of that taken on 
June 17, 1991, (paying down the credit line by nineteen thousand 
dollars and creating an available balance thereby), when considered 
with the testimony of Clyde Davis and Steven Davis as to the impact 
of their conversation with Chris Wold, and their understanding of 
the effect of that pay down, when compared to the June 7, 1991 
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letter which asked for a totally different performance, leads to 
the inescapable conclusion that the representation was made that 
the credit line would be returned to good standing. U.S. Bancorp is 
therefore estopped from taking advantage of the change of the 
position of the Davises. At a minimum, a genuine issue of material 
fact exists with regard to the misrepresentation and the estoppel 
claims, and summary judgment may not properly enter herein. 
IV. STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY. 
Defendants bring up statute of frauds under Utah Code 
Annotated Section 25-5-4(6), stating that a credit agreement that 
modifies an obligation to repay money must be in writing, and that 
an oral representation returning the credit line to good standing 
is such an agreement. 
The credit line agreement has been relied upon by plaintiffs 
in this matter. It also does not require the defendant to default 
the credit line if payments are slow. There is a wide discretion 
allowed in the credit agreement for action. In this case, there is 
no doubt that the credit line was paid down and that interest was 
brought current. All of the actions of the plaintiffs fell directly 
within the terms of the existing credit agreement, and were not a 
new agreement as alleged by defendants. Plaintiffs were induced to 
make a significant payment with the understanding that the credit 
line would return or remain in good standing. The credit line had 
not been formally closed, nor had it been defaulted. Defendant 
cannot point to one (1) letter prior to June 17, 1991 wherein they 
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closed the line of credit. That being the case, their argument that 
we are claiming that a new credit agreement was established is not 
well-founded. Finally, the statute of frauds is not a shield for 
fraud. Jacobsen v. Cox, 202 P.2d 714, 115 UT 102 (1949). 
V. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS EXISTS. 
Defendant properly stated the Johnson v. Rogers (763 P. 2d 771 
(Utah 1988)) test taken from Section 313 of the Restatement (2nd) 
of Torts which provides: 
If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to 
another, he is subject to liability to the other for 
resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor (a) should 
have realized that his conduct involved unreasonable risk 
of causing the distress...and (b) from facts known to him 
should have realized that the distress, if it were 
caused, might result in illness or bodily harm. 
It is undisputed the U.S. Bancorp is the actor in question and 
that the acts of the agents are in fact attributed to the 
principal. The principal knew of the harm that could flow from 
emotional distress from its acts, Bert Wilson having notice. The 
knowledge of U.S. Bancorp is the key in as much as the acts of alJL 
of its agents are imputed to the principal and the principal is the 
defendant in this matter, not Chris Wold. The simple facts are that 
defendant did not care what harm its acts caused and simply was 
intent on putting sufficient pressure on plaintiffs that they would 
pay off the credit line. Plaintiffs changed their position by 
making a draw down under the impression that the credit line would 
continue in good standing and the credit balance would be available 
by such pay down on June 17, 1991. See Deposition of Clyde Davis, 
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Page 28, Lines 18-23. The shock and surprise that the credit line 
was not in good standing as a result of the act caused the 
emotional distress. Any reasonable person would know that cutting 
the financial resources off for an individual in financial 
difficulty is going to cause emotional distress, especially those 
already so afflicted. Foreclosure on a home will have the same 
effect, as any reasonable person also knows. Only if U.S. Bancorp 
claims that they are not reasonable, and therefore should not be 
expected to understand the unreasonable risks of injury their acts 
causing distress cause, would they not be liable. 
It is undisputed that you must take the victim as you find 
him. Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451,453 (1966). It 
is further undisputed in Utah that the injured party "is entitled 
to recover damages for injury she suffered, including any 
aggravation or lighting up of such a pre-existing condition or 
disability, which was proximately caused the defendants' 
negligence". Brunson, 412. P.2d at 453. 
Because U.S. Bancorp knew of the pre-existing condition, and 
that it was an unreasonable risk of causing distress to deny access 
to a credit line in good standing and to foreclose upon a home, 
there is no doubt that U.S. Bancorp negligently inflicted emotional 
distress on the plaintiffs. 
VI. PUBLICATION OCCURRED. 
Although none of the non-party witnesses can testify to having 
seen the notice, defendant states that the notice was posted. Steve 
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Davis has testified that he saw the notice, and word of the notice 
reached the witnesses from other sources than the Davis family. See 
Memorandum in Support. Defamation therefore occurred. 
VII. SLANDER BY DEFENDANT EFFECTED THE STABLE VALUE OF THE 
PROPERTY 
It is undisputed that plaintiffs notified defendant that 
foreclosure was improper and that they believed that they were 
entitled to use of the credit line under the existing agreement. 
There is also no doubt that the stable value of the property was 
affected. During the time in which the foreclosure was posted, 
offers of less than full value were received. See Deposition of 
Joseph P. Jennings, Page 4, Lines 23-25. In as much as the stable 
value of the property was impaired directly by the actions of 
defendant, plaintiffs are entitled to damages for the slander of 
title in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The Motion for Summary Judgment by U.S. Bancorp must be denied 
in as much as genuine issues of material fact exist. 
DATED this J>/day of J^gjj ^ ^ ^ W ^ < ^ T 1993. 
RI CHARD ^ s^CCSTsON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
275 North Main 
PO Box 288 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
(801) 798-3574 
8 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 3 I day of 
1994, I 4»aiid-jlgllJjgLed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
to: 
Stephen B. Elggren 
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE 
Counsel for Defendant U.S. Bancorp. 
261 East 300 South, #175 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson 
Michael W. Homer, Esq. 
H. Michael Drake, Esq. 
Co-Counsel for U.S. Bancorp 
175 South West Temple, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
DATED this 21 
day of 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
-OOO-
STEVEN C. DAVIS and KRISTI 
A. DAVIS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
U. S. BANCORP MORTGAGE 
COMPANY, formerly U.S. 
BANCORP REAL ESTATE SERVICES, 
formerly U.S. THRIFT & LOAN, 
a corporation authorized to 
do business in Utah, and H. 
CLYDE DAVIS, 
Case No. 920400802 
Honorable Guy R. Burningham 
Deposition of: 
STEVEN C. DAVIS 
CERTIFIED COPY 
Defendants. 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 18th day of May, 1993, 
the deposition of STEVEN C. DAVIS , produced as a witness 
herein at the instance of the defendants, in the above-
entitled action now pending in the above-named court, was 
taken before Rashell Garcia, a Certified Shorthand Reporter 
and Notary Public in and for the state of Utah! commencing, 
at the hour of 9:10 a*m* of said day at the offices of 
Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson,, 175 South West Temple, 
Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County/ State of Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Notice* 
RASHELLGARCIA 
BSB Nomm 
INDEPENDENT BEPORTJNG 
SERVICE 
Certified'ShorthandJteporiers (801 
Word Index included with this Min-U-ScripU 
L>avis v. u.s. tsancorp Mortgage <^ o. 
{1] got nothing in this automobile accident — I got nothing out 
(2] of this automobile accident — and wc had a long drawn-out 
(3] period of time that wc thought wc should just go to Dad and 
(4] let Khsti just take care of, I guess her personal concern 
(5] about all the moneys that he had given her. And it was 
(6] basically for that reason. 
173 Q: Let me get a feci for your understanding. Prior 
(8] to Kristi signing this quit-claim deed, did you have any 
(9J interest in the property in Highland, you personally? 
(10] A: I personally had equity in this property in 
(11] Highland where the home is from 1985 through about 1987. 
(121 Q: You personally? 
[13] A: Me personally. 
[14J Q: Now, at the time of this quit-claim deed, the day 
(15] before the quit-claim deed was signed, did you have any 
(16] interest in this property? 
(17] A: At the time we talked about this with my father, 
(18] he indicated it was a temporary basis because he wanted this 
(18] to be my wife's home. 
PQ] Q: But I'm asking if you — 
(21] A: I did not. 
(22] Q: Okay. Now, prior to executing this quit-claim 
(23] deed, what is your understanding about Kristi's interest in 
(24] the property in Highland? 
(25] A: The way I understood it, it was a temporary- thing 
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(1) because of the guilt we both felt, but mostly what Kristi 
fZ] felt about what was owed to Clyde Davis in all of the matters 
{3] not related to this home. 
W Q: I'm talking about just before executing this quit-
P] claim deed, what interest did Kristi have in the home, as you 
fS] understand it? 
(7] A: Substantial. 
(B] Q: And after executing this quit-claim deed, what's 
(9] your understanding of Kristi's interest in the home? 
|1Q| A: On a temporary basis, it was being conveyed to my 
[11] father because of the debt she owed him in all of their 
(12] unrelated matters from this home. 
(13] Q: Do you have some kind of unwritten understanding 
[14] with your fetber that once you pay him back, he will 
(15] reconvey to Kristi and to you— 
(16] A: Yes. 
(17] Q: — to Kristi and to you or to Kristi only? 
(18] A: It's up to him. 
(19] Q: It's based on the trust that you have of your 
(20] father? 
P1] A: Absolutely. 
£22) Q: What's your understanding about Clyde Davis' 
(23] present interest in the home in Highland? Do you understand 
P4] that he is the sole owner of the home? 
(25] A: I do, on a temporary basis like I just explained 
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(1] to you. 
(2] Q: Based upon your trust of him some day rcconvcying? 
pj A: That's right. 
(4] Q: Let me show you — first we'll go to Exhibit 15, 
(S] and this appears to be an affidavit Did you type this 
(6] affidavit yourself or was this prepared by an attorney for 
(7] you? 
fB] A: I prepared it. 
p] Q: And where did you prepare it? 
(10] A: It could have been at UVCC or it could have been 
(11] at home. 
(12] Q: Okay. Let me have you look at paragraph 2. The 
(13] next to the last sentence reads, "I have no interest, nor any 
(14] ownership in the subject property being secured for the 
(15] revolving credit." And that property is Lot 28 in Pheasant 
(16] Hollow. Is that a true statement, that you do not have any 
(17] interest in that home? 
(18] A: That is a true statement. On the date that I 
(19] signed this on the 6th of April, 1991 I did not have any 
(20] interest. 
(21] Q: Let me have you look back, if you would, at that 
(22] date. You just looked at the third page and it says April of 
(23] 1991- If I could just have you look at page 2 of the 
(24] affidavit, there are a lot of references to July 12,1991, 
(25] August 12,1991, September '91. So it appears to me that 
Pag«5C 
(1] April '91 is not a correct date, it might need to be April 
(2] *92.1 Just wonder if you could clarify that for me. 
(3] A: Iw0uldm0stlysuspectthatthatwa3atyp0.lt 
(4] should reflect 1992 on page 3. 
(5] Q: So it was a true statement on April 19,1992 that 
[6] you did not have any interest in the home in Highland? 
(7] A: That's correct. 
[8] 0 : Is that still a true statement today? 
(9] A: Yes. 
(10] Q: Let me have you look at paragraph 3. There's a 
(11] reference to Bert Wilson authorizing and permitting you to 
(12] withdraw funds for the revolving credit to pay the monthly 
(13] interest due. Can you tell me when and how Bert Wilson gave 
(14] you that authorization? 
(15] A: Yes. I went — or I went with my wife in to meet 
(16] with him and we explained the situation or requested that we 
(17] take advance payments, and then during that same week, the 
(18] irvolvmgtoaiimtcrcstd^waspaidforoutof taking moneys 
(19] from the revolving loan. And that was a total practice 
(20] between Bert Wilson and myself ongoingly. 
pi] 0 : How many times did you meet with Bert Wilson? 
(22] A: Many times. 
(23] Q: And was it a one time thing that he said or was it 
(24] a situation where you would go in, you'd talk to him about 
(25] what you wanted to do, and he said, yes, that's okay? 
PageS 
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ft] A; I would say I met with him cither weekly or every 
p] other week and I would go in and we would chat casually and 
p] whatever. And we had met maybe on a one or two time 
W arrangement for that, on that. So it could have Just been 
(5} one or two occasions that we specifically talked about that 
f5J purpose, but he understood and it was ongoing — he would 
(7] hold checks and hold them for several days until they were 
M good. 
p] I mean, it was a very good, comfortable 
(10| relationship I had with Bert Wilson and he knew very much 
(11] afrout my personal situation during this period of time. 
(122 O: I can understand that, but there's a difference 
(13] between holding a check drawn on your bank account somewhere 
("Mj else and allowing you to withdraw funds from the credit line 
(1SJ and then repay those same moneys back to the credit line 
(16J paying for interest. 
(17] A: I specifically remember talking to Bert Wilson at 
(16] least on two occasions — it could have been more — about, 
(18] right now we're short of the money, that I'm going to take 
J2DJ out of our equity position of the revolving loan and go into 
pi ] it, and I came back that same week and paid down on the 
(22J interest due or — not paid down, paid the interest due for 
£23| Chat month on the revolving credit line. 
(24] Q: Well, I understand what you just said. I still 
(25] don't think you've focused on what I'm really asking and that 
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p] to, did Bert WUson, say take a withdrawal today and repay 
{2} it in a week as interest? 
p] A: Maybe not in those exact words but with the same 
W —with the topic and need for repayment, yes. 
(53 Q: Tell me the exact words he used or as close to it 
($ as you can get. 
(7] A: I explained to him that the next month, we would 
{BJ be getting money in from sales or equity or revenue and that 
fB) right this month, we were short of the money and that I 
(10] needed to draw on that. And there was no problem with that. 
(11] Then I came back a few days later and explained to 
(T2J him that this was money Z had previously taken out earlier 
(1^ that week and that it was the moneys due for the interest on 
(14] a monthly basis and that I'm paying that, and he said, "I 
[15] appreciate that" 
(16] Q: So, as I Just understood what you said, you had 
(17] talked to him about your financial status and your hopes for 
(16] the coming weeks. He would allow a withdrawal, you'd take 
(10) the money, and then a few days later, you would come back in 
(20) and tell him, •Here's part of the money I withdrew, I'm 
pi] paying my interest payment.*' 
(22] A: Yes. And (think it was an integral part — 
(Z3J because Bert Wilson was a stockholder of Kanco Energy or one 
(24] of the public companies I was in operation for and so he had 
f2S] a personal interest in how the company was going, how the 
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' (i] sales arc doing, how everything is proceeding and was totally 
{2] aware that this was a business revolving loan. 
(3] Q: What interest did Bert Wilson have? 
(4] A: 1 don't know. ] just remember on one or two 
(S] occasions that he said he's now a stockholder. I says, 
(6] 'Great, you're going to have a great opportunity." 
(7] Q: Now, as we've talked here this morning or this 
£g] afternoon, you talked about situations where you went to talk 
p] to Bert Wilson but you haven't told me of an occasion when 
(10] you went in to withdraw funds for the sole purpose of 
{11] repaying those funds within a few days to cover interest and 
[\2i telling Bert before you withdrew the funds that that was the 
(13] intent and the purpose for the withdrawal from the credit 
(U] line. 
(15] Can you recall an occasion when you went to Bert 
(16] Wilson and said, "I need to take some money out so that 1 can 
(17] repay it in a few days as interest"? 
(18] A: I thought I told that exactly, as I best recall. 
(18] I took money out of my revolving line in expectation of — 
(20] well, 1 took it out for whatever purpose. There was 
(21] complications of coming back and there was an interest 
(22] payment due that month on the revolving line and so I would 
(23J come backa few days later and pay on the interest due that 
(24] week or that month. 
(25] And I recall specifically talking to Bert about 
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(1] that on a couple of occasions. After those couple of 
(2] occasions, I just operated that way because I thought he knew 
(3J about it. 
(4] Q: But, again, you're talking about a situation where 
(5] you didn't let Bert know about the payment of the interest 
(6} until after funds were already withdrawn; is that true? 
(7] A: No, it could have been also during the same time, 
p] I would have to go back on the same— these specific dates 
p] that were provided to me by VS. Bancorp because these arc 
(10] dates from a computer printout that they used. 
(11] It could have been the very same day I told him, I 
(12] need to withdraw to pay the interest. I don't remember. I 
(13] fust remember during a specific week period that I was having 
(uj a slow time getting equity in or money in to make payments 
(15] down, so I went in and told him specifically what I was 
(16] doing. 
(17] Q: Okay. Now there were times then that you 
(18] discussed with Bert just what you related to me? 
(19] A: That's correct. 
pqj Q: And there were other times when you did not 
(21] discuss with Bert what you were going to do but a withdrawal 
(22] was allowed and in a few days you made an interest payment; 
(23] is that true? There were times you told Bert and there were 
(24] times that you didn't tell Bert? 
{25] A: That's correct 
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1 payments of interest only for the months of June, July and 
2 August, approximate amount of $445, and then it talks about 
3 the negative amortization on the first mortgage, and then the 
4 second paragraph the second sentence it says we're hereby 
5 notifying that we expect timely payments for the June 12th, 
6 July 12th and August 12th payments and payment in full by 
7 August 27, 1991 by either other sources or by the selling of 
8 your home. If these conditions are not met we will start 
9 foreclosure. And you apparently received Exhibit 7 because 
10 those are your notes on the bottom of it. Is there any 
11 recollection that has come to you at this point about those 
12 discussions about whether the additional payments would have 
13 to be made after August? 
14 A This, I didn't pay any attention to, because I told 
15 them when I discussed it on the phone, I told them it would be 
16 with the line of credit. And I didn't even go into all of the 
17 details, when he said that everything would go on, that was 
18 all that I was interested in, so that's why I wrote that the 
19 way I did. 
20 Q Did you make any requests after the payment of the 
21 $20,000 for any draws on the account? 
22 A No. 
23 Q Were you present with Steve when he made any 
24 requests? 
25 A No. 
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